



In the case of Kearsarge, 2 Curtis' Rep. 423-5, it was decided
that the statute of Maine, giving to material men, and mechanics
and laborers, a privileged lien on the vessel for their security for
materials furnished and labor performed in building or repairing a
vessel, did not extend to materials and labor furnished for two ves-
sels, the language of the statute being any vessel, in the singular
number. It is obvious that the reason for allowing the privilege,
or preference, is the same in one case as the other ; and in the Dis-
trict Court it was allowed on this ground: Ware's Rep. 536, 2d
edit. The law was considered to be a remedial law, and as such
should receive a liberal construction in furtherance of the general
policy of the law makers. In the Circuit Court the decree was
reversed, and it was held that the statute should receive a strict
construction on the ground that the preference given to material
men and mechanics operated to the prejudice of the general credi-
tors of the owner. The general principle on which the Circuit
Court decided, was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the case of
T'andeventer vs. The Yankee Blade, 19 How. 29, that such lien
was to be held to a strict construction in favor of general creditors.
The first inquiry suggested by the question is, whether these
privileged liens granted by a State statute are to be considered and
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treated as maritime liens. That they are so is not now open to
controversy. It has been so often decided by all the maritime
courts in the United States, that they may be enforced by a Court
of Admiralty, that it seems unnecessary to refer to more than the
single case of Peroux vs. Howard, 7 Pet. 502, in which it was first
established by the Supreme Court. Now, it is only on the ground
that they are maritime liens that a Court of Admiralty has juris-
diction to enforce them.
The first observation to which the reasoning, both of the Circuit
and Supreme Court is open is, that in these privileged maritime
liens, the thing itself against which they exist, is considered as a
principal debtor, in the old maritime law as the principal debtor.
They always include a tacit hypothecation of the thing. .Emerigon,
Contrats a la Grosse, ch. 12, § 1 and 2. Being privileged, they are
preferred to all preceding liens on the thing, (not having a like or
superior privilege,) and a fortiori to all the personal creditors of the
owner. Against the thing, the lien creditors right is a jus in re.
The general creditors right is personal against the owner. He has
a ju8 ad rem against the ship precisely as he has against all
the owner's other property. So far as the privileged creditors'
materials and labor have contributed to make the ship, it is con-
sidered as his property, which he has not parted with until the price
is paid, unless he has agreed to trust to the personal credit of the
owner: .Domat Loi8 Civile, Lib. 3, Tit. 1,§4, No. 6. In the case of
the Rebecca, Ware's Rep. 127, the old law on this subject was fully
examined. See also the Phoebe, lb. 265, and the Paragon, lb. 826.
In this view his lien prejudices nobody; he merely reclaims his own,
sa proyre chose, says Domat, as the vendor does when he reclaims
or retakes the thing sold for the unpaid price. Such is the general
nature of these privileged maritime liens.
But the question in this case was not directly in regard to the
nature and quality of the lien. It was when such a lien is given
by a State statute, whether the law ought to receive a favorable or
a restrictive construction. The quality of the lien is of no other
importance than as it has a bearing on this question. The reason
given for a restrictive construction is that the preference of the lien
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creditor operates to the prejudice of the general creditors of the
owner. The authorities relied upon for this interpretation are
.Emerigon, (ontrat a la Grosse, Ch. 12; Boulay Paty, Droit Mari-
time, vol. 1, p. 36; Pardessus, vol. 3, p. 597, 598, and they are
entitled to the more consideration as they apply to maritime liens.
They satisfactorily show, that by the law of France, liens or privi-
leges are strictijuris, and not to be extended by analogy. There
can be no privilege without an express law authorizing it, or an
express stipulation for one. But in what precise sense French
legists are to be understood when they say that privileges are never
to be implied or extended, by parity of reason from one creditor to
another is, I think, not very clear. The general doctrine is de-
clared on terms sufficiently broad and comprehensive, but a con-
siderable latitude is apparently allowed in the application of it.
We have a somewhat striking instance in Valin. In the Ordo-
nance de la Marine, Liv. 1, Tit. 14, art. 16, there is an enumeration
of privileges against a vessel sold after a voyage, with an arrange-
ment of the order of preference. In the first rank are placed the
seamen for their wages. 2. Money lent for the necessities of the
ship during the voyage. 3. Money lent for the outfit of the ship.
4. Merchant shippers. There are but two cases, says Yalin, in
which merchant shippers can have a privilege against the vessel.
1st-Where their goods are not delivered by the master. 2d-
When they are averaged (damaged) by the fault of the master or
mariners. Valin, in his commentary, says: "it does not follow
that there are not. other privileged creditors not named, nor that
these are in the first rank; and he proceeds to name siZ not men-
tioned in the article:
1. The expenses of justice.
2. The expenses of seizure.
3. The wages of the ship-keeper, both beforb and after the
seizure.
4. Storage of the rigging.
5. Repairs of the sails and rigging, when they have been re-
paired, because their value is thereby increased.
6. Wharfage.
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Shippers, says Yalin, whose goods are sold for the necessities of
the ship during the voyage, though not named in the article, have a
concurrent privilege with those who lend money for the same cause;
such a sale is considered as a forced loan.
To the lenders of money for the outfit of the ship, who are placed
in the third rank, are to be added boarding-house keepers, who, by
order of the master and consent of the owner, have boarded the
crew, as well as the vendor, for the price. The privileges of these,
says Yalin, must rank in this class; because, without these, the
ship could not have made the voyage. The insurer, for the same
reason, for his premium, if not paid ought to be ranked with the
lender on bottomry, before the departure of the ship from her home
port. See Em. Ch. 12, section 4 ; also,
Notwithstanding the comprehensive terms in which the doctrine
is expressed by Emerigon, it seems to me very clear that Yalin
does reason from analogy, and extends the privilege from person to
person on the equitable principle of interpreting laws, that where
the reason is the same the law is the same. Indeed, it is evident
that Emerigon does himself. He says that he was consulted on this
question, whether material men who furnished cordage and timber
bad the same lien as the lender of money to pay for them, and he
answered that they had, though it is the lender only that is named
in the law. He says it is immaterial whether the money or mate-
rials are furnished. This explanation, he says, is not extensiva but
intellectiva: Ch. 12, sect. 4. That is, one stands on the same
reason as the other.
I think it may safely be taken for granted that there is no spe-
cific law by which boarding-house keepers are made privileged
creditors against a vessel, or for allowing a ship-keeper a privilege
for his wages, both before and after the seizure. On what ground,
then, does Yalin concede to these creditors a privilege and place
them in the same rank with' bottomry holders for money lent for
the outfit of the ship, and with material men for repairs ? It is
because the board of a crew is just as necessary to enable the ship
to perform the voyage as the bottomry money or repairs. Why
have the expenses of seizure and the keepers' wages privileges
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which precede that of the seamen's wages for the last voyage ? It
is because the services of these creditors were necessary for the
preservation of the common pledge for all. It is for the same
reason that the lender of money for repairs is preferred to the
vender for the price. It is their money that has preserved the
ship.
In what sense is Emerigon to be understood when he says that
privileges are stricti juris, and not to be extended by analogy de
re in rem nor de persona in personam? New privileges cannot be
created but by law: that is, a new title or cause of privilege. But
the law having established a title of privilege founded on a general
cause or consideration, all persons and all cases that come within
the reason of the law are entitled to the privilege. The law, by
enumerating certain persons and cases, does not exclude others that
come within the reason of the law, from the common privilege,
unless such appears to be clearly the intention of the law makers.
The cases and persons enumerated are to bb considered as named
by way of example and not of limitation. This is the rule for the
interpretation of such statutes given by Voet ad Pandectas, Lib. 20,
No. 26. And that such was the reasoning of Emerigon himself, is we
think evident from Oh. 3, Sect. 9, Assurances. The ordonance
supposes that the premium will be paid down in ready money, and is
therefore not enumerated among privileged debts. But if not, is it
thereby excluded? By no means. It is part of the cost of outfit,
and, with them, takes its privilege by identity of reason.
The whole of this doctrine of privilege is derived into the laws
of Europe from the jurisprudence of Rome; and the general char-
acter and principle, the indoles of the law, if I may be allowed the
expression, will be best understood by remounting to its source, and
studying it there. It may not be out of place here to make one
observation, which may, perhaps, serve to explain some ambiguities
in the language of juris consults on this subject. Priveligia, in the
Roman law, are of two kinds, privileges, properly so called, and
priveligia creditorum. There is a broad distinction between them.
The first were special favors granted by the sovereign. They
owed their origin to positive law, and ordinarily, though not uni-
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versally, received a strict construction: Voet ad Pand. Lib. 1,
4-16. The second, the privileges of creditors, were principally,
but with some exception, deduced by reasoning of the juris con-
sults from the principles of universal law and natural justice.
They received a favorable construction, and were familiarly extended
by analogy de re ad rem and de persona ad personam.
The subject of the privileges of creditors is treated by the sage,
Domat, who has been described as the restorer of reason to the
s~ience of jurisprudence, in his Lois Civiles, Lib. 8, Tit. 1, sect. 5,
under the title of Hypothiques. In his manner of expounding
the law there is nothing to indicate that, in his mind, these privi-
leges were odious as infringing the equal rights of others; but
he gives to the principle of the law of privilege the same free opera-
tibn and expansion as to any other remedial and beneficial law,
having its foundation in natural justice and public utility. An
instance occurs in No. 9 of this section. The text of the digest
gives to those, who loan money for the repair of a ship or house, a
privilege against the thing for the repayment of the money: Dig.
12, 1, 25; Dig. 42, 5, 26; Dig. 42, 5, 24, 51. So, adds Domat,
for a stronger reason is the privilege allowed to the mechanics and
laborers by whom the work is done, and Emerigon reasons, as we
have seen, in the same way on the same case, though the mechanics
are not mentioned in the law.
The general doctrine of the privileges of such creditors rests in
the Roman law on one of the first laws of property; that what is
mine cannot be transferred to another without my consent. .Td,
quod nostrum est, sine nostro facto ad alium transjerri non potest:
Dig. 50, 17, 11. This is the general foundation of the law, which
applies to the great mass, for the greatest proportion of these pri-
vileged creditors. They did not owe their existence to any special
law, nor even to a pretorian edict, but were a natural and logical
deduction from one of the great laws of property. There are
exceptions, it is true, of privilege given by positive law, as the pri-
vileges of the fiscus, the privilege of the widow for her dower, the
privilege of funeral expenses, and some others. Such exceptional
privileges granted to favored persons in every cultivated system of
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jurisprudence would generally be held to be stricti juris. Yet, in
the interpretation of these, the juris consults carried them out by
analogical reasoning, to their just and proper extent. A privilege
was allowed against the estate of the deceased for funeral expenses.
What was included in funeral expenses? did they extend to the
mourning dresses of the widow? It was held that they did, as
constituting part of the funeral honors of the deceased. In France,
where this law was adopted, the period of mourning was held to be
a year; and some of the provinces extended the privilege of mourn-
ing dresses for the full year, provided the widow continued a
blameless widowhood so long, and gave to her a hypote que on her
deceased husband's estate for her mourning habits for the whole
year: Toullier Droit Civil Francais, Vol. 13, No. 265-274.
Domat, in treating this subject, commences with the privilege of
the vendor for the price of the thing sold. There is a tacit condi-
tion in every contract of sale that the right of property shall not
pass to the purchaser until the price is paid. Quod vendidi, non
aliter fit accipientis, quam si aut pretium solutum sit, aut satis eo
nomine factum, aut etiam fidem habueriumus emptori sine ulla
satisfactione: Dig. 18, 1, 19. The vendors privilege, a lien, is
founded on his right of property, with which he has not parted.
A creditor who has loaned the money by which the price is paid,
is subrogated to the vendor's right. The law, by an equitable con-
struction of the acts of the parties, considers him who pays the
price as acquiring the vendor's rights in the property held, and he
has a lien upon it for his security before any other creditor of the
purchaser. But if a surety is given, and he is obliged to pay the
price he will have no lien, because the right of property passes to
the buyer, the giving a surety being equivalent to payment: Dig.
18, 1, 53.
One who furnishes materials, or performs labor for the repairs of
a ship or a house, is supposed to render this service on the tacit con-
dition that the materials furnished and the product of the labor
shall become the property of the owner of the ship only when the
price is paid. And he has a privilege against the whole ship,
because his services are supposed to have preserved the pledge for
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all who have an interest in it: solvam fecit totius pignoris cau-
sam. A creditor who loans money to pay for these repairs, takes
his place and privilege, as one who lends for the payment of the
price to the vendor. In fact, the privilege seems to have been first
established in the jurisprudence of Rome in favor of the lender, as
be is the creditor who is always mentioned: Dig. 42, 5, 26; Dig.
21, 1, 25.; Dig. 42, 5, 34; Dig. 42, 3, 1.
. There is another class of creditors mentioned by Domat in Nos. 7
and 8 of this section, whose lien illustrates the nature and quality
of this privilege. Those who loan money for the'melioration or
improvement of an estate have a privilege against these improve-
ments. It is their money which made them, and they stand in the
place and have all the equity of the vendor for the price. But
their lien does not extend like that of the lender for repairs to the
whole thing. If these improvements are destroyed, their lien is
gone. The privilege of this creditor is not mentioned in any law
of the Digest. It is drawn by Domat from the general analogy of
the law, and limited by its reason. The only text quoted is,
(Dig. 19,1, 13, § 2,) Venditor enim quasi pignus retinere potest cum
numquam venditit. These words, which apply to the vendor, may
also, says Domat, apply for this article, for he who makes the melio-
ration in relation to this holds the place of the vendor.
The owner of a farm has a privilege against the fruits of the farm
for his rent. The rent is the price of those fruits,. and until that is
paid they remain, says Domat, his property, sapropre chose: Liv.
1,Tit.1, sect. 5, No. 12. In prcediis rusticisfructus qui ibi nascuntur
tacite intelliguntur pignori ease domino fundi locati, etiamsi nomi-
natim id non conveniat: Dig. 22, 2, 7. It is a natural lien
implied by the nature of the contract, and need not be named
in it.
A carrier has a lien on the merchandise for the cost of trans.
portation and for the duties he has paid ; and Domat adds, this
privilege is acquired by all those whose money has been employed
for expenses of a like necessity, as for the keeping and feed of
teams: Liv. 3, 1, 5, No. 11. This example shows how easily this
lien was extended, by analogy, to all persons and cases that came
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within the principle of the privilege without any special provision
of law or particular stipulation of the contract.
These examples are principally taken from Domat, and they very
clearly show that he, as well as Valin, in his interpretation and
application of the law, reasoned from analogy, extending the privi-
lege from person to person and from case to case, as they would
any other remedial law. I think it equally clear that the Roman
jurisconsults expounded and applied the principle of these natural
privileges in the same way.
The Roman law of hypothecation, or mortgage, followed the obvi-
ous rule of natural justice by giving the preference to the older
creditor. Qui pIior "st in tempore potior est injure. But with
privileges it was otherwise. Another rule of preference was esta-
blished, founded on the nature of the cause or consideration. Pri-
viligia non extempore aestimantur, sed ex causa ; et si ejusdem tituli
fuerint coneurrunt, licet diversitates temporis in his fuerint: Dig. 42,
5, 32. This inversion of the natural order was not established by
positive law. It was a rule of jurisprudence, deduced by the juris-
consults from the principles of natural justice and consideration of
public utility. It rests, for its authority, on what the civilians call
the celebrated law tnterdum taken into the Digest from the Dis-
putations of Ulpian; this is, I believe, the only text of the Digest
where the general doctrine is stated. Interdum posterior potior est
priori; ut puta, si in rem istam conservandam impensum est, quod,
sequens credidit ; veluti si navis fuit obligata, et ad emandam earn
rem vel reficiendam ego credidero: Dig. 20,4, 5. In this law we have
the rule, and the next the reason of this preference of the later to
the earlier lien. It is not because it is established by positive law,
but because hujus enim pecunia salvam fecit totius pignorius cau-
sam; that is, the money loaned for equipment and repairs. And
he proceeds, reasoning from analogy, to extend the lien to a loan
for payment for the provision of the crew, quod quis poterit admit-
tern si in cibaria nautarum fuerit creditum sine quibus, navis salva
pervenire non poterat. And further in §§ 1, 2:-if one lends money
on goods already hypothecated ut salvce ftunt, vel ut naulurn exsol-
vatur, potentior erit, licet posterior sit; nam ipsum naulum potentius
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est. Salvage and freight are preferred to a prior hypothecation,
and the lender to pay is subrogated to the right of the salvors and
carriers. And § 2 gives us another analogy :-Tantundem dicetur
et ai merces horreorum, vel areae vel vecturae jumentorum debetur ;
nam et hie potentior erit. The warehouse rent and trackage are
preferred to the mortgagee.
If I am not mistaken, the whole of this class of privileges, which
have their origin in natural rights and public utility, grew up as a
part of the unwritten and customary law of Rome; they were
sanctioned by the courts of justice; as cases were presented for adju-
dication and moulded and fashioned by the jurisconsults, with all that
legal acumen and logical precision which so eminently distinguish the
great masters of Roman jurisprudence, to meet at once the de-
mands of justice and the exigencies of business in a highly-culti-
vated society. The examples and illustrations have, perhaps, been
multiplied beyond necessity; but the object of them is, in the first
place, to show the nature and reason of privilege, and the second,
to show the degree of favor with which it was entertained. And I
think it is apparent that neither in the Roman law, where these
privileges have their source, nor in that of France, which adopted
them, were they narrowed by a jealous and restrictive construction;
they were familiarly extended to all cases that came within the
principle of the law. The same principles of analogical reasoning
were applied to this title of privilege as to other remedial laws in
furtherance of right and justice-ubi idem ratio idem est ju8.
How, then, shall we explain the language of Emerigon that privi-
leges are 8trieti juris, and never to be extended by analogy to cases
not mentioned by the law.
Besides these natural privileges, which I have been considering,
constituting part of the common unwritten law of Rome, moribus
et consuetudine introductam Dig. 1, 8, 82, there were others intro-
duced by positive law in the interest of particular classes of favored
creditors; as that of the widow for her dower, that of the fieu8 that
of minors against the estate of their tutors and curators, and some
others. These were of strict construction. They were conceded
by special laws, and were confined to persons and cases expressed by
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the law. The privilege of the widow for her dower could not, by
parity of reason, be extended to a minor against the estate of his
tutor; nor could her privilege for her dower be extended to embrace
any other claim she might have against her deceased husband's
estate. The extent of the privilege wa's measured by the words of the
law. It could not be extended to include other persons or causes by
analogy. To these the rule of construction applied. Quod vero Contra
rationem juris receptum eat, non e8t producendum ad con8equen-
tias: Dig. 1, 8,14. But privileges established by custom, and hav-
ing their foundation in natural justice, in the laws of property and
considerations of public utility, were liberally interpreted and applied
by analogy to all persons and cases that came within the reason of
the law. Such are liens of material men and mechanics against
vessels for materials and labor in building and repairing them.
Why, then, should a State statute granting these privileges receive,
in our jurisprudence, a narrow construction, confining them to the ip-
sissimis verbis of the law ? Voet, as has before been seen, gives the
opposite rule for the interpretation of such statutes. He says, when,
in a statute, there is an enumeration of privileged persons or causes
that they ought not to be ranked in the precise order in which
they are named, nor are others to be excluded from the privilege
who are not enumerated if they are privileged by common law injurii
communi, or, as I would say, by the nature of the debt, unless that
is the manifest intention of the Legislature. Otherwise it ought to
be presumed that there are mentioned, merely as examples, causa
exempli ad Pand.: Lib. 20, 4, 26. The principle to be applied to
this statute of Maine is one of increasing importance in this country.
Most of our maritime States, as well as those bordering on the great
lakes, have statutes of a similar character, giving a privileged lien
against vessels for materials, labor, and supplies. The difference
between a narrow and liberal construction of these statutes will
make a sensible difference in the extent of the remedies they will
afford.
